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Abstract
Recent programmable networking paradigms, such as cloud computing, fog computing, software-
defined networks, and network function virtualization gain significant traction in industry and academia. 
While these newly developed networking technologies open a pathway to new architectures and enable 
a faster innovation cycle, there exist many problems in this area.  In this article, we provide a review of 
these programmable networking architectures for comparison. Second, we provide a survey of security 
attacks and defense mechanisms in these emerging programmable networking technologies.
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I. Introduction and Motivation
Communication networks in general, and the Internet 
in particular, have become an essential part of society. 
The evolution of networks continues as the technologies 
progress; on the other hand, the complexity of 
operations, protocols, and interdependencies makes our 
understanding of networks formidable. While the open 
nature of the Internet enables its growth and innovation, 
this openness also has become an obstacle for its 
flexibility and management. In the past two decades, 
research efforts have aimed to design and develop 
programmable networks to overcome this ossification 
in network management. Programmable networks allow 
customization of networks thus leading to faster service 
creation and granular network management.
In recent years, we have seen an explosion in network 
technology (however, we note that the fundamentals 
of these technological progresses can be rooted back 
to 1960s [1]–[3]). Notable networking technology 
progress has been in Cloud Computing (CC), Fog 
Computing (FC), Software-Defined Networks (SDNs), 
and Network Function Virtualization (NFV). These 
emerging network paradigms are becoming more 
widespread. For example, cloud-based applications 
such as Google Docs, Apple iCloud, Amazon Cloud 
Drive, Microsoft OneDrive, and Dropbox are becoming 
pervasive in our daily lives. Moreover, among the many 
emerging paradigms that use these new networking 
technologies are: Internet of Things (IoT) [4], big data 
analytics [5], connected vehicles [6], and intelligent 
environments such as smart city [7] and smart grid 
[8]. Additionally, these emerging networking concepts 
(in particular OpenFlow-enabled SDNs) are widely 
accepted by major service providers, data center 
networks, and network equipment vendors [1], [9]–
[11]. It is noted that in 2016, the SDN market will 
worth $3.7 billion and will reach $15.6 billion in 2018 
[10]. The North American SDN market is projected to 
increase with a Compound Annual Growth Rate of 
25% between 2014 and 2019 [12].
As communication networks became a critical 
infrastructure and ubiquitous utility offering a variety 
of services and applications, communication networks 
also become an obvious target for intelligent adversaries 
with economical, political, or recreational objectives. 
Resilience, which is defined as providing an acceptable 
level of service in the face of attacks and challenges 
[13], has become an important objective to achieve for 
all players including: end users, equipment providers, 
service providers, governments, and researchers. The 
two main resilience disciplines include trustworthiness, 
which specifies measurable properties of network 
resilience and challenge tolerance, which addresses 
varying classes of challenges to the network [13]. Security 
is also a resilience discipline, and it is an important 
attribute of the emerging programmable networking 
technologies such as CC, FC, SDN, and NFV.
In this brief survey paper we have two modest 
objectives: i) to provide a brief overview of the emerging 
programmable networking architectures; ii) to briefly 
survey of security attacks and defense mechanisms in 
cloud computing, fog computing, SDN, and NFV. We 
note that there are extensive surveys of cloud security 
[14], [15] and SDN security [9], [11]. We did not find 
comprehensive surveys relating to fog computing and 
NFV security since they are relatively recent topics being 
investigated. We also keep our presentation to the work 
published within the last five years and include related 
industry - organization publications in addition to the 
academic papers in our survey.
II. Overview of Emerging Technologies
Virtualization is the core of the emerging programmable 
network technologies, which aims for efficient utilization 
of shared physical resources. The history of virtualization 
goes back to early 1960s with the IBM time-sharing 
machines (i.e., virtual operating systems). While the 
virtual memory concept was developed in the 1970s, 
VLAN (Virtual Local Area Network) development was 
in the 1980s. While these new programmable network 
paradigms, CC, FC, SDN, NFV, relate to each other, they 
do not depend on each other but rather complement 
one another [1], [2].  These emerging technologies are 
summarized in Table I and explained in the rest of this 
section.
A. Cloud Computing Architecture
Cloud computing has a service-oriented architecture, 
as shown in Figure 1. In this architecture, the resources 
(i.e., processing, storage, bandwidth, infrastructure) are 
controlled to offer different services to customers [2], 
[16]–[18]. The services can be IaaS (Infrastructure-as-a-
Service), PaaS (Platform-as-a-Service), SaaS (Software-
as-a-Service), DaaS (Data-as-a-Service), SecaaS 
(Security-as-a-Service), XaaS (Anything-as-a-Service), 
etc. The control functions include cloud operating 
system, orchestration, and optimization.
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B. Fog Computing Architecture
Fog computing (named to mean that resources are 
closer to end users (ground)), is a virtualized platform 
and an extension of cloud computing for applications 
such as IoT, data analytics, Smart X, connected vehicles 
[19]. Some of the main characteristics of location-aware 
fog platforms are low latency and mobility support 
for applications and services. The new fog computing 
paradigm has an hierarchical architecture (shown 
in Figure 2) in which at the bottom are end users, at 
the edge are the fog devices, and at the core is the 
cloud [20], [21]. This hierarchical model is similar to the 
Internet’s hierarchical model in which at the top is the 
core layer, in the middle is the distribution layer, and at 
the bottom is the access layer.
C. SDN Architecture
The concept of programmable networks is not new, 
but recent efforts have focused on Software-Defined 
Networks (SDNs), a concept that evolved from early 
ideas of programmable networks [1], [3]. The simplified 
architecture of the SDN (Software-Defined Network) is 
shown in Figure 3. The two main ideas of SDNs are: 
1) to decouple the control and data planes, 2) to 
consolidate the control plane (i.e., logically) such that 
it controls multiple data-plane elements. Decoupling of 
control and data planes can be accomplished via an API 
(Application Programming Interface) such as OpenFlow 
[1]. A northbound API such as OpenDaylight provides 
the interface between control and application planes. An 
example of a joint SDN and cloud network operation is 
TABLE I. Summary of Emerging Technologies






















Fig. 1. Cloud computing architecture
Fig. 2. Fog computing architecture
Fig. 3. SDN architecture
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using SDN to traffic engineer an application hosted on 
the cloud network [18].
D. NFV Architecture
NFV (Network Function Virtualization) aims to virtualize 
network functions necessary for serving customers 
using shared physical resources that are implemented 
on COTS (commercial off-the-shelf) hardware. With the 
current trends, i.e., reduced ARPU (Average Revenue 
Per User), increased CAPEX (Capital Expenditures), and 
OPEX (Operational Expenditures), service providers 
cannot keep up with a silo of network infrastructure 
that does not provide new service to their customer. 
Instead, a better alternative would be to provide new 
(or existing) services using COTS (commercial off-the-
shelf) hardware. Moreover, by off-loading functions of 
ASICs and FPGA hardware to software, this opens a 
path for development of new business models to the 
market in a fast and cost-efficient fashion. Consequently, 
NFV aims to virtualize network functions necessary for 
serving customers using shared physical resources that 
are implemented on COTS hardware.
ETSI (European Telecommunications Standards Institute) 
Network Functions Virtualisation Industry Specification 
Group (NFV ISG) leads the development and architecting 
the NFV - related technologies [22]. It is foreseen that 
NFV will reduce the cost of operating networks as the 
infrastructure transitions from custom-built hardware 
to using commercial hardware for compute, storage, 
and network resources [23]. Moreover, the passage of 
network functions from hardware to software will open 
the pathway to new business models and innovation. 
However, there are some realistic risks to be considered:
1. There are potential risks associated with increased 
OPEX [23].
2. The performance of shared virtualized network 
functions will not be same as the dedicated physical 
resources [24].
3. The value added by transitioning functions from 
hardware implementations to softwarization in 
certain application domains (e.g. home network vs. 
access network) will not be as high [24].
The architectural framework (shown in Figure 4) and 
design philosophy of virtualized network functions is 
described by ETSI [25]. In this architecture, the NFV 
infrastructure layer consists of physical and virtual 
resources, as well as a virtualization layer that provides 
partitioning of hardware resources and providing virtual 
resources to the VNF (Virtual Network Function) layer. 
The virtualization layer function is similar to a hypervisor 
or a virtual machine (VM). Example VNFs include network 
functionalities such as IDS (Intrusion Detection System), 
IPS (Intrusion Prevention System), FW (Firewall), and 
load balancer. Orthogonal to the NFV Infrastructure and 
VNF layers, the management and orchestration layer 
provides the control and monitoring of the overall VNF 
lifecycle.
III. Network Security
We present security issues and solutions in the cloud 
computing, fog computing, SDN, and NFV in this section. 
Virtualization is a fundamental technology that enables 
existence of these emergent networking technologies. 
We will not present virtualization security here, but we 
point the reader to extensive literature surveys [26]–
[28].
A. Cloud Computing Security
The Cloud Security Alliance (CSA) guidance document 
summarizes the best practices for secure cloud operation 
and governance [29]. It recommends evaluation of the 
assets (i.e., data or application/function/process) on the 
different cloud deployment models (i.e., public, private, 
community, hybrid) under different hosting scenarios 
(i.e., internal, external, combined). Aside from industry 
recommendation, there have been extensive surveys of 
the cloud security in the literature [14], [15], [30]–[32].
Security issues related to three cloud service delivery 
models (SaaS, PaaS, IaaS) are discussed [30]. Cloud 
threats, vulnerabilities, and attacks are extensively 
categorized according to cloud deployment and service 
delivery models [14], [15]. User-level threats at physical, 
virtualization, and application layers are detailed 
alongside security requirements for cloud computing 
[31]. Authors argue that a combination of PKI (Public 
Key Infrastructure), SSO (Single Sign-On), and LDAP 
Fig. 4. NFV architecture
30 www.hkn.org // THE BRIDGE
FEATURE
(Lightweight Directory Access Protocol) mechanisms can 
address horizontal security requirements in the cloud 
computing [31]. Software patching, data isolation across 
logical resources sharing same physical substrates, 
SSO for authentication across multiple clouds are 
additional considerations to secure the cloud computing 
infrastructure [32]. Furthermore, infrastructure- and 
process-level diversity is promoted as defensive 
mechanisms against the attacks due to monoculture 
(e.g., hardware monoculture, software monoculture) 
[33].
B. Fog Computing Security
A man-in-the-middle (MiM) attack on a gateway fog 
device is performed and shown that the MiM attack 
can be stealthy based on CPU utilization and memory 
consumption. Further, an authentication scheme is 
proposed to overcome such MiM attacks, in particular 
when the connection between fog and cloud is not 
stable [20]. Several security and privacy issues such as 
intrusion detection, access control, secure data storage 
and computation are discussed within the context of fog 
computing [21].
C. SDN Security
There have been extensive surveys of SDN security 
published in the recent past [9]–[11], [34], [35]. It 
is a consensus that there are two ideas in regards to 
SDN security: 1) there are those who conduct research 
aiming to secure the programmable network and 2) 
those who conduct research aiming to provide security 
as a service [9], [10]. Moreover, an extensive survey 
of resilience research (i.e., survivability, dependability, 
disruption tolerance, performability, traffic tolerance, 
security) in SDNs is presented [34]. Authors conclude 
based on their survey that security is built in SDNs via 
(i) as an addition or (ii) as an embedded property in the 
architecture [34]. Regardless of the school of thought, 
next, we summarize SDN security research.
In extensive surveys of the SDN security [11], [35], 
authors present a review of the literature on the past 
SDN security efforts. Security challenges and solutions 
in each of the application, control, and data planes of 
the SDNs are presented in detail. Some of the attacks in 
each layer include: application plane attacks (e.g., access 
control for third party applications), control plane attacks 
(e.g., fraudulent flow rules insertion, DoS attacks, and 
unauthorized access to the controller), and data plane 
attacks such as flooding the SDN switch and router 
components. Authors argue that while SDNs ease the 
global visibility of network states against challenges 
and attacks, the logically centralized control plane 
has also become an attractive target for the attackers 
[11], [35]. Other surveys review SDN security from a 
STRIDE (Spoofing, Tampering, Repudiation, Information 
disclosure, Denial of Service, and Elevation of Privilege) 
perspective [9], [36]. Additionally, a brief survey of 
wireless SDN and SDN experimentation literature 
is presented [36]. Recently, we conducted security 
experiments on the GENI testbed performing DDoS 
attacks (ICMP echo flood and TCP SYN flood) [37].
Some of the secure mechanisms against attacks in the 
SDN domain can be listed as: access control providing 
authorization and authentication, attack detection 
and filtering, flow aggregation to prevent information 
disclosure, and rate limiting at the control plane to 
thwart DDoS attacks [9]. It was noted that most of 
these defense mechanisms are not implemented. In 
addition to the defense mechanisms [9], federation of 
heterogeneous network applications (e.g. IoT, SmartX, 
connected vehicles) and defining security policies across 
different domains using SDN will be a future research 
direction [10].
D. NFV Security
ETSI Network Functions Virtualisation Industry 
Specification Group (ISG) has published several 
specifications in regards to NFV security [38]–[42]. 
Potential threats and players in the security domain 
are explained in the ETSI Security Problem Statement 
specification [38]. NFV poses threats due to network 
protocol vulnerabilities (e.g., flooding attack, routing 
insecurity), which are not related with virtualization, and 
due to virtualization (e.g., memory leaks and interrupt 
isolation) [38]. Furthermore, virtualization can, while 
mitigating some, incur new security threats [38]. Other 
specifications discuss OpenStack security [39], trust and 
its domains [40], lawful intercept points [41], and host 
application and platform security [42] as they relate to 
NFV.
In addition to the ETSI ISG specifications, other papers 
are available in the literature that we summarize next. A 
DDoS attack mitigation strategy using NFV technology 
is discussed [43]. In another paper, authors propose an 
architecture for trust monitoring in SDN and NFV [44]. In 
this architecture, an out-of-band SDN verifier component 
is added to SDN architecture to attest the network 
configuration, hardware identity check, and software 
trust measurement. They also investigate potential 
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architectures to build the attestation mechanism in 
virtual hosts executing critical network functions [44]. 
An extended SDN architecture to prevent intrusions 
via addition of virtualized packet inspection function is 
presented [45]. The simulation result of such a virtualized 
DPI function can improve the network performance 
(e.g., throughput, overhead) significantly compared to 
stand-alone OpenFlow-based SDN architecture [45]. 
An anti-virus (AV) solution was proposed and tested as 
a virtual network function [46]. It was shown that this 
AV-NFV solution did not require a proxy compared to 
the traditional AV solutions and its performance and 
memory usage was better. A virtual firewall leveraging 
both SDN and NFV techniques is presented that adapts 
to changing virtual network characteristics [47]. Intrusion 
detection is experimented on a testbed as a virtualized 
network function [48] and further the intrusion detection 
function is incorporated into service chaining [49]. Some 
security-related use cases for the NFV environments is 
presented [50]. In addition to the security aspects of 
the NFV, placement of network security functions (e.g., 
packet inspection, firewalls) in the topology is also an 
active area of research [47], [51].
IV. Conclusions
We are in an exciting era in new networking technology 
progression. Programmable networks, which provide 
greater control and management functionality, as well 
as enabling the pathway to greater innovation lifecycle, 
are being developed and deployed. Of these recently 
networking technologies, we observe cloud computing, 
fog computing, software-defined networks, and network 
function virtualization are becoming more pervasive 
for applications. We described the architecture of 
these different network technologies. We observe that 
different network architectures show similarities. At the 
bottom layer is some infrastructure (physical and/or 
virtual), in the middle is control and management of 
these infrastructures, and on the top is the delivery of 
some services/functions/applications. Another common 
important feature of these networking technologies is 
that they rely heavily on virtualization. Next, we present 
a survey of the security issues in CC, FC, SDN, and NFV. 
We observe that while cloud and SDN security literature 
is becoming rich, fog computing and NFV security is in its 
infancy. We believe that, regardless of the technologies, 
all these different emergent programmable networks 
pave the road to the Future Internet Architectures.
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